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JUDICIAL PATRONAGE OF 'HONOR KILLINGS'
IN PAKISTAN: THE SUPREME COURT'S
PERSISTENT ADHERENCE TO THE DOCTRINE
OF GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION
Moeen H. Cheemat
I. INTRODUCTION
Pakistan has earned considerable notoriety on the international
stage because of its failure to curb violent crimes against women committed
in the name of honor.1 Academic analyses of the state's failure to deter
honor killings focus primarily on lacunae in statutory law (especially the
Islamized provisions introduced by legislation), while assigning secondary
blame to gaps in the criminal justice system, failings of the policing system,
and the inherent defects in the workings of the informal tribal or commu-
nity-based adjudicatory mechanisms. 2 However, most of these studies fail
to dissect the perplexing array of Pakistan's laws, 6specially the different
punishment regimes and rules concerning pardon that apply to various cate-
t Assistant Professor of Law & Policy at the Lahore University of Management
Sciences (LUMS), Pakistan: LL.M. Harvard Law School, 1999; LL.B. University
of London, 1998. I am grateful to first year law students at the Department of Law
& Policy for their valuable research assistance and comments.
The term 'honor killing' is generally used to refer to murder by male family
members of their female relatives on account of perceived dishonor caused to the
family in a number of circumstances, most often when the female relative chooses
to marry or divorce of her own accord, is accused of having illicit sexual relations
with someone, or even when she has been raped. For cultural, sociological and
economic analysis of the conception of honor underlying such violence and the
causes of such crimes see Mazna Hussain, "Take My Riches, Give Me Justice": A
Contextual Analysis Of Pakistan's Honour Crimes Legislation, 29 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 223, 226-31 (2006); Rachel A. Ruane, Murder In The Name Of Honour:
Violence Against Women In Jordan And Pakistan, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1523,
1530-35 (2000); and AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PAKISTAN: HONOUR KILLINGS OF
GIRLS AND WOMEN (1999), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA
330181999ENGLISH/$File/ASA3301899.pdf. For recent statistics on honor kill-
ings in Pakistan, see Bruce Loudon, Pakistan police fail as 'honour killings' soar,
The Australian, Feb. 10, 2007, available at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/
story/0,20867,21201328-2703,00.htmil.
2 See, e.g., Hussain, supra note 1; Ruane, supra note 1; Christina A. Madek,
Killing Dishonour: Effective Eradication Of Honour Killing, 29 SUFFOLK TRANS-
NAT'L L. REV. 53 (2005).
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gories of murder.3 As such, these studies miss the mark since the main
culprit is neither the substantive legal provisions nor the frequently demon-
ized Islamic law provisions, but rather, the superior judiciary of Pakistan
which has historically patronized honor killing by consistently exercising
all available discretion in sentencing to the benefit of those accused of such
crimes.
Although Pakistan's Parliament has now passed an act with the
stated aim of deterring murder in the 'name or on the pretext of honor,' 4 the
author anticipates that the historical approach of the judiciary towards
honor killings will be adhered to, resulting in the continued, relatively leni-
ent treatment of honor killings. Certain ambiguities rooted in the text of the
Act appear to encourage the courts to disregard the Act in many cases of
honor killings.5 In order to understand the basis of this prediction, it is im-
portant to appreciate the history of the judicial approach towards sentencing
and the allegiance to the exculpatory doctrine of grave and sudden provoca-
tion in Pakistan, lately in the face of statutory intervention as well as Is-
lamic law doctrines. Part II of this Note shall, therefore, review the
historical (pre-1990) approach of Pakistan's courts towards punishment of
the accused under Pakistan's Penal Code provisions dating back to British
colonial times. Part III shall outline the Islamized provisions that the Qisas
and Diyat legislation introduced in 1990 and the approach adopted by Paki-
stan's courts towards implementing and applying these laws from 1990 un-
til 1995. Part IV shall analyze two important Supreme Court judgments
delivered in late 1995 and reported in early 1996, which opened the flood-
gates for judicial patronage of honor killings. Part V shall analyze the at-
tempt by the legislature in 2004 to withdraw judicial discretion in
sentencing for cases of murder in the name of honor, and Part VI shall
3 See Ruane, supra note 1 (presenting a comparatively more informative analysis
of Pakistan's Qisas and Diyat laws). However, even this work includes several
simplistic or inaccurate statements and fails to identify exactly how honor killings
slip through the various cracks in the system, which shall be identified in this
article.
4 CRIMINAL LAW (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2004 (Act I of 2005, Gazette of Pakistan,
Extraordinary, Part II, 11 th January, 2005).
5 Many critics of the Act anticipated that the legislation will fail to deliver. See,
e.g., Hussain, supra note 1 at 239-41; AsIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CON-
FRONTING HONOUR KILLINGS (2004), available at http://www.countercurrents.org/
hr-achr291004.htm. However, once again the focus was on the failure to rectify the
perceived defects in the Qisas and Diyat laws rather than the weakness of the law in
terms of curbing the abuse of judicial discretion in sentencing and thwarting the
availability of grave and sudden provocation as a defense.
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identify the increasingly visible signs that the Supreme Court is ready to
sidestep this legislation, once again, in order to offer patronage to honor
killings.
II. PRE-1990 JUDICIAL APPROACH TO SENTENCING IN CASES OF
'GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION'
Prior to 1990, Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860
(P.P.C.) laid down the law governing murder, whereby murder was punish-
able by death or imprisonment for life at a minimum. However, Section 302
incorporated a number of specific exceptions, the first of which provided
that it "is not murder if the offender, while deprived of the power of self-
control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person
who gave the provocation." A case which fell within this exception was
thus reduced to 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' which was
punishable under Section 304, Part I, by transportation for life or imprison-
ment up to ten years, thereby providing substantial discretion to judges in
sentencing.
In Kamal v. State, the Supreme Court decided unanimously that
both the trial court and the High Court had erred in awarding capital punish-
ment to the accused for murder under Section 302 of the P.P.C. 6 The Su-
preme Court found that the accused had committed culpable homicide not
amounting to murder under grave and sudden provocation when he killed
his wife, and, thus, was punishable under Section 304, Part I. Whereas,
Salahuddin Ahmed, J. recommended the maximum sentence of imprison-
ment for life, the other two judges favored a lesser sentence. Muhammad
Afzal Cheema, J. noted the defense counsel's observation that the usual
"award of sentences in such cases . . .ranged from six months to five
years," and sentenced the accused to time already served which was more
than five years and "good enough to meet the ends of justice. '7 Dorab Patel,
J. referred to several past judgments in which offenders had been given
sentences ranging between one and three years, and agreed that the sentence
undergone was thus adequate in these circumstances. 8
6 Kamal v. State, P.L.D.1977 S.C. 153.
7 Id. at 159.
8 Id. at 162-63. Dorab Patel, J. referred to the following cases, amongst others:
a. State v. Akbar, P.L.D. 1961 Lah. 24, where the respondent
had been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for one year
when it was proven that he bad caught his sister in the act of
intercourse with her paramour and had killed only the
paramour.
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The above case was followed by Munir Ahmad v. State, where the
appellant had killed the suspected paramour of his wife: the deceased had
abused him by calling him a pimp and man without honor. 9 The Supreme
Court converted his conviction to a crime punishable under Section 304,
Part I and sentenced him to imprisonment for the period already undergone
by him, that being six years and three months. Likewise, in Shamoon v.
State the Supreme Court sentenced the appellant to time already served,
having altered his conviction from murder under Section 302 to culpable
homicide under Section 304, Part 1.10 Earlier, the Federal Shariat Court had
sentenced him to life imprisonment, having relied on his confessional state-
ment that he had killed the deceased, but having disregarded his plea that he
had done so upon seeing him in a compromising situation with his wife.
The Shariat Court doubted the defense of provocation on the grounds that if
he had in fact seen his wife in this condition, she would not have escaped
unhurt.11 The Supreme Court held that if the conviction of an accused is
based solely or primarily on his confessional statement, then it must be
taken in its entirety. Niamat Ali v. Muhammad Yaqub offers yet another
example of the judicial approach under the pre-1990 penal laws of Pakistan
concerning grave and sudden provocation. 12 The Supreme Court refused to
enhance a sentence of two years given to the appellant for the murder of his
wife on the grounds that "the respondent had lost his control on seeing the
deceased indulging in immoral activity."' 13
In these and other similar cases, provocation was invariably consid-
ered grave when suspicions of sexual impropriety by a man's wife, sister,
b. Muhammad Sadiq v. State, P.L.D. 1966 Lah. 104, where the
facts were similar, a Division Bench of the West Pakistan
High Court awarded a sentence of two years' R. I.
c. In Abdul Khanan Watamir v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1939 Lah.
436, the sentence awarded was three years. The appellant had
proven that on returning home late at night he had seen a
man going out of the house, and when he asked his wife for
an explanation as she abused him, he killed her.
d. Mewa v. State, P.L.D. 1958 Lah. 468, with facts very similar
to Kamal v. State, in which a Division Bench of the West
Pakistan High Court had awarded only three years'
imprisonment.
9 Munir Ahmad v. State,1994 S.C.M.R. 80.
10 Shamoon v. State,1995 S.C.M.R. 1377.
11 Id. at 1379.
12 Niamat Ali v. Muhammad Yaqub, 1988 S.C.M.R. 62.
13 Id. at 64.
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cousin or mother were raised. However, the defense of provocation was
only available if the provocation was sudden and caused the accused to lose
self-control. If there had been a cooling-off period and the accused had
committed the offence with pre-meditation, then the accused would be lia-
ble for murder. 14 However, even in these cases, "killing for honor" was held
to deserve mitigated punishment. 15
III. GuL HASAN KHAN INTRODUCTION OF THE ISLAMIC
LAWS OF QISAS AND DIYAT
In 1989, the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court finally
decided a number of petitions in Federation of Pakistan v. Gul Hasan
Khan, some of which had been pending since 1980. These petitions chal-
lenged the existing provisions relating to murder, culpable homicide, and
hurt under the P.P.C.16 Exercising its unprecedented constitutional powers,
the Shariat Bench of the apex court unanimously declared that the relevant
14 See, e.g., Allah Wasaya v. State, 1977 S.C.M.R. 44, where the sentence of
death was maintained. The court pointed out that:
The main ingredient of Exception I is the deprivation of power of
self-control as a result of grave and sudden provocation. Loss of
self-control and premeditation are not compatible phenomena...
They suspected that the deceased had formed an illicit liaison
with [wife of the accused] and was on an amorous visit. If they
had killed [the deceased] there and then it could be at best argued
that his very presence at night gave sudden and grave provoca-
tion. As seen they caught the deceased and tied his hands with a
rope and took him away to a distance of nearly 600 yards and
killed him in a field. Thereafter they severed the head from the
trunk and carried the two parts of dead body further away and
buried them at two different places. Having disposed of the dead
body they concealed their weapons of offence ... The conduct of
the appellants thus showed full meditation rather than deprivation
of self-control.
15 See, e.g., Ahmad v. State, 1982 S.C.M.R. 1049, where a sentence of death was
substituted for life imprisonment.
16 See Federation of Pakistan v. Gul Hasan Khan, P.L.D. 1989 S.C. 633. The
Shariat Appellate Bench disposed of 11 petitions, the earliest of which had been
decided by the Federal Shariat Court in 1980 and the latest in 1986. It is interesting
to note that in an era where the state policy was to Islamize laws, especially crimi-
nal laws, and several contentious pieces of legislation had been brought about by
the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq such as the Hudood laws, the Shariat
Appellate Bench had delayed taking such a major step down the path of
Islamization.
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provisions of the P.P.C. were null and void for lack of conformity with the
injunctions of Islam and ordered the government to replace these with suita-
ble provisions as per the directions of the bench. To comply with the
Shariat Court's dictates, the President promulgated the Criminal Law (Sec-
ond Amendment) Ordinance of 1990, frequently referred to as the Qisas and
Diyat Ordinance, which introduced provisions deemed to conform with the
injunctions of Islam as elaborated in the judgment. The Qisas and Diyat
Ordinance brought forth a new categorization of homicides and hurt, and
created provisions allowing for private settlement of these offenses. 17
On the issue of grave and sudden provocation, Justice Taqi Usmani
declared in his opinion in Gul Hasan Khan that the Exception I of Section
300 diverged from Islamic precepts:
As per Islamic rulings, provocation, no matter how grave or
sudden, cannot by itself reduce the gravity of the offence of
murder. Instead, the relevant issue from an Islamic perspec-
tive would be that whether the deceased was indulging in
such acts which would amount to an offence punishable by
death under Islamic law? For example, if a man sees his
wife committing adultery, an offence punishable by death
under Islamic law, and kills his wife and her paramour in
such circumstances, and brings evidence of adultery as per
the requisite standard of proof under Islamic law, then he
shall indeed be exempt from Qisas (capital punishment in
retribution). However, since he should have approached the
authorities in such circumstances rather than taking the law
in his own hands, he has committed a crime against the
17 The drafters of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) had created two types
of distinctions between crimes which were alien to the British Common Law. First,
the Cr.P.C. distinguished between compoundable and non-compoundable offences.
Compoundable offences may be settled by the parties (offender and victim or his/
her heirs), subject to the approval of the trial court, as if it were a private or civil
dispute. Prior to 1990, murder and grievous hurt were non-compoundable. The sec-
ond distinction was between cognizable (those that are investigated and prosecuted
by the state) and non-cognizable offences (which may only be prosecuted by the
complainant). Murder was and continues to be a cognizable offence. However, due
to the weaknesses of the investigation and public prosecution functions of the state,
most prosecutions, even of very serious crimes including murder, are in practice
brought by and pursued by the victims or their families.
2008 JUDICIAL PATRONAGE OF 'HONOR KILLINGS' 57
state and may be given any punishment by the state (as
tazir).18
The above-quoted dictum seems to have dramatically raised the bar
for claiming a defense in honor killing situations. Presumptively, the ac-
cused could only claim an exemption if he brought forth four eyewitnesses
of adultery, a near-impossible standard of proof. Further, killing a person
caught in the act of fornication, which is sexual intercourse by one who is
not presently married or has never previously been married, would never be
justified even if four eyewitnesses were forthcoming since only adultery is
punishable by death under Islamic law. 19 This enabled Justice Nasim Hasan
Shah, member of the bench in Gul Hasan Khan, to conclude in State v.
Abdul Waheed that after the Islamization of the concerned laws, the defense
of grave and sudden provocation was not available to the accused when he
killed the deceased upon seeing him in a compromising situation with his
sister while in the presence of two eyewitnesses:
The observations made in Gul Hasan's case clearly show
that grave and sudden provocation is not an exemption per
se and the punishment of Qisas [death as retribution] where
Qatl-i-Amd [intentional murder] is committed under grave
and sudden provocation, can be mitigated only if proof of
Zina [adultery] is produced, which confirms to the required
standard of evidence prescribed under Islamic injunctions. 20
Hence, the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance excluded all exceptions in-
cluding grave and sudden provocation, sudden fight, and exceeding the
right of private defense from Section 300. However, it would be incorrect to
state that these Islamized criminal provisions excluded the possibility of
leniency for honor killing on account of the exclusion of the defense of
grave and sudden provocation. In the aftermath of Gul Hasan Khan, murder
was re-classified into four separate sub-categories:
a. Qatl-i-Amd liable to Qisas, punishable under Section
302(a) of P.P.C.:21 This offense requires a heightened
standard of proof which may be in the form of a volun-
tary confession before the trial court or two eyewit-
18 Gul Hasan Khan, P.L.D. 1989 S.C. at 674. This passage as well as the entire
opinion was written in Urdu. The translation and the emphasis are by the author of
this Note.
19 See, e.g., State v. Muhammad Hanif, 1992 S.C.M.R. 2047 at 2053-54.
20 State v. Abdul Waheed, 1992 P.Cr.L.J. 1596 at 1601.
21 PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16, § 302(a) (1860).
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nesses who meet the requirement of tazkiyah-ul-
shuhood inquiry of credibility.22 In such a case, the le-
gal heirs of the victim have the choice of exercising
qisas, that is capital punishment as retribution, or par-
doning the offender either in lieu of compensation or
even without any compensation. 23 If the heirs choose to
exercise their right of qisas, the state has no authority
to pardon the offender or remit the sentence. However,
if any one of the heirs pardons the offender and waives
his or her right of qisas, qisas can not be enforced. The
judge may, nonetheless, give a sentence of imprison-
ment of up to fourteen years as tazir (discretionary
punishment under Islamic law) keeping in view the
principle of fasad-fil-arz, i.e. if the offender is a previ-
ous convict, professional criminal or if the murder was
committed in a brutal manner.24
b. Qatl-i-Amd liable to Tazir, punishable under Section
302(b) of P.P.C.: If proof of Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas
is not available, but murder is proven beyond reasona-
ble doubt based upon other evidence - such as one
eyewitness and circumstantial evidence; or two or
more eyewitnesses who do not meet the credibility test
of tazkiyah-ul-shuhood - then the accused is con-
victed of Qatl-i-Amd liable to tazir. The punishment
for this offence is death or imprisonment for life at a
minimum.25 Even this offence is now 'compoundable'
under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) but
only if all of the victim's heirs voluntarily agree to par-
don the offender subject to a compromise or settle-
ment. The judge has the discretion to either accept that
compromise and compound the offence with the result
22 PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16, § 304 (1860). See Gulbar v. State, P.L.D. 2002 Pesh.
65, for a detailed discussion of these evidentiary requirements.
23 PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16, §§ 309-10 (1860). The right to exercise qisas or to
waive it belongs to the walis (legal heirs according to Islamic laws of inheritance).
See Muhammad Jabbar v. State, 2000 P.Cr.L.J. 1688.
24 PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16, § 311 (1860).
25 PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16, § 302(b) (1860).
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that the accused is acquitted, or to reject the compro-
mise and award a sentence under Section 302(b). 26
c. Qatl-i-Amd where Qisas is not applicable, punishable
under Section 302(c): Section 302(c) states that the of-
fender shall be punished with imprisonment of up to
twenty-five years where "according to Injunctions of
Islam the punishment of qisas is not applicable. 27
From 1990 until 1995, several eminent judges of the
superior courts of Pakistan, including justices of the
Supreme Court, erroneously thought that Section
302(c) applied to the fourth category of Qatl-i-Amd de-
scribed below.28 This raised a very important question:
what category or categories of murder was this provi-
sion really designed to cover?
d. Qatl-i-Amd not liable to Qisas, punishable under Sec-
tion 308: As per Section 306, Qatl-i-Amd shall not lia-
ble to qisas if (a) the offender is a minor or is insane,
(b) the offender has caused the death of a direct de-
scendant, and (c) any heir of the victim is a direct de-
scendant of the offender. 29 As per Section 307(c), qisas
shall not be enforced if as a result of the death of an
heir of the victim "the right of qisas devolves on the
offender" or on any person "who has no right of qisas
against the offender" in accordance with Section 306.30
Section 308 explicitly provides the punishment for this
category of qati and not Section 302(c), which is diyat
(monetary compensation for unlawfully causing death)
and up to fourteen years as tazir if the judge chooses to
sentence the accused to imprisonment.3 1
26 See Hussain Bux v. State, P.L.D. 2003 Kar. 127, and Muhammad Aslam v.
Shaukat Ali, 1997 S.C.M.R. 1307, for a distinction between waiver of qisas in a
case of Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas and compounding of offense in a case of Qatl-i-
Amd liable to tazir.
27 PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16, § 302(c) (1860).
28 See, e.g., Ali Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. 274 at 290. See
note 53 infra.
29 PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16, § 306 (1860).
30 PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16, § 307(c) (1860).
31 PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16, § 308 (1860).
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A careful analysis of the above categorization of murder reveals
numerous gaps, allowing for the lenient treatment of honor killings. First, in
an honor killing scenario, the offender may conveniently confess before the
court, thereby making his offense one of Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas. As
such, any one of his family members may pardon him and save him from
capital punishment. For example, if B (brother) commits honor killing of S
(his sister), then either one of his parents, who are also heirs of the victim,
may waive qisas. Although the court could still award imprisonment for up
to fourteen years as tazir, in an overwhelming majority of cases, trial as
well as appellate courts adhered to the pre-1990 approach by deeming such
cases as falling outside the definition of fasad-fil-arz. Second, in cases
where the offender committed murder of either his daughter or his wife, and
had surviving children, the case would fall under Section 308 and was pun-
ishable by imprisonment for up to fourteen years at the discretion of the
judge.3 2 Again, in such cases, judges have consistently imposed lenient
sentences.
A majority of murder cases, however, fall under the category of
Qatl-i-Amd liable to tazir. This is especially true when the offender has not
only killed his family member but has also killed his or her suspected par-
amour. From 1990 to 1995, the offender was in a bind as far as making a
strategic pick of the sub-categories of Qatl-i-Amd. If he confessed to the
murder, he may have received a pardon from his own family, but would
very likely have suffered capital punishment as qisas if the male victim's
family insisted on it. On the other hand, if the accused did not confess and
was instead convicted under Section 302(b), he would receive a minimum
punishment of life imprisonment.33 Yet, if the offender was rich or influen-
tial within the community, as was the case in many instances, the offender
could safely bet on the courts accepting a compounding of Qatl-i-Amd lia-
ble to qisas or a compromise of Qatl-i-Amd liable to tazir, without much
scrutiny even if such a settlement had not been freely negotiated.
32 See, e.g., Khalil-ul-Zaman v. Supreme Appellate Court, Lahore, P.L.D. 1994
S.C. 885. The accused was convicted of the murder of his wife and sentenced to
death for Qatl-i-Amd liable to tazir. The accused had a living child from his mar-
riage with the deceased and the Supreme Court held that his case clearly fell under
§ 308 and not under § 302(b). The Supreme Court stated that the "error committed
by the Courts in . . sentencing him to death is so serious that had the petitioner
eventually been hanged to death . it would have amounted to murder through
judicial process."
33 In fact, grave and sudden provocation was frequently used as a mitigating factor
in cases of Qatl-i-Amd liable to tazir, used by the courts to avoid inflicting the
"normal' sentence of capital punishment.
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IV. OPENING THE FLOODGATES OF PROVOCATION: JUDICIAL
PATRONAGE OF HONOR KILLINGS
In 1995, having struggled for years with its inability to show leni-
ency for grave and sudden provocation in the face of a contrarian statutory
scheme and a weighty opinion on Islamic law, the Supreme Court of Paki-
stan finally yielded. 34 First, in Abdul Haque v. The State, the Supreme Court
held that in a case of grave and sudden provocation, if the victim is not
maasoom-ud-dam (completely innocent), then qisas is not applicable
against the offender under Islamic law.35 The Court distinguished the judg-
ment of Nasim Hassan Shah, J. in Abdul Waheed by implying that prece-
dent was merely that the plea of grave and sudden provocation should be
34 The jurisprudence of Pakistan's courts was not consistent on this issue and
signs of dissent had been emerging as early as 1992. See Muhammad Hanif, 1992
S.C.M.R. 2047; the Lahore High Court's judgment in Ali Muhammad v. Ali
Muhammad, 1993 P.Cr.L.J. 557. In the Supreme Court in Abdul Haque v. The
State, Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, incumbent Chief Justice, noted the considerations in
favor of recognizing provocation as a defense:
The plea of diminished liability in respect of offences relating to
human body committed under grave and sudden provocation has
been well recognized in the sub-continent for more than a hun-
dred years. There is a good reason for that: a person who com-
mits culpable homicide out of compulsions, ethical or otherwise,
not brought about by himself, cannot in the matter of punishment
be placed on the same footing as a cold-blooded murderer or a
hired assassin. A serious question for consideration arises
whether the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance,
1990, was intended to do away with the preferential treatment
that had always been accorded to a person who took another per-
son's life under circumstances where he had lost all self-control.
The question is of a great fundamental importance not only for
the reason that it will affect a large number of pending cases but
also because it has a bearing on the attitude and reflexes of the
people under the most testing circumstances when their natural
reactions compel them to act in a certain manner.
See Abdul Haque v. The State, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. 1 at 7.
" Abdul Haque v. The State, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. 1. Earlier, a majority of the judges
in the High Court of Balochistan, including Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry
(present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan) who authored the leading
opinion, had awarded the sentence of death on the basis that the Islamized statutory
scheme "does not provide any exception in respect of the offence of Qatl-i-Amd, if
committed due to grave and sudden provocation." See Abdul Haque v. The State,
P.L.D. 1995 Quetta 83 at 90.
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based upon some credible evidence, and not totally fabricated.3 6 Citing
Muhammad Hanif v. State and Verse 4:34 of the Qur'an,3 7 the Court sug-
gested an alternative ground for exempting cases of honor killing from the
operation of Section 302(a) by comparing such cases to those in which de-
fense of another person is raised as an explanation for causing death in
order to prevent rape.38 In other words, even if the woman is a consenting
party to unlawful sexual intercourse, her husband or other male family
members, who are her protectors and guardians,, have the right to kill her
paramour and, thereby claim the defense of that person.39
36 Abdul Haque, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. 1 at 28. Citing with approval from a pre-1990
case - Mohib Ali v. State, 1985 S.C.M.R. 2055 - the Court continued in its efforts
of creating the illusion that the exclusion of Exception I from § 300 were of no
consequence: "A mere allegation of moral laxity without any unimpeachable evi-
dence to substantiate would not constitute grave and sudden provocation. If such
pleas without any evidence are accepted, it would give a licence to people to kill
innocent people."
37 Verse 34 of Surah Al-Nisa reads: "Men are the protectors and maintainers of
women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and be-
cause they support them from their means." (Translation by Yusuf Ali)
38 The court quote the following extract from Muhammad Hanif, 1992 S.C.M.R.
2047:
A person like the deceased who suffered from a prohibition under
Qura'nic Injunctions not to touch or deal with a lady who was not
Mehram to him could not so disgrace and insult as to evoke the
corresponding duty of the husband to protect and guard the wife.
Such a man under the Injunctions of Islam cannot be said to be
Maasoom-ud?Dam when he is indulging in such an activity. Be it
a person disgracing a lady or committing Zina?bil?Jabr with her
being unmarried, it is not provocation but an exercise of the right
conferred on the husband under the express words of the Qur'an
itself. Qisas will not be liable in such a situation.
Abdul Haque, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. 1 at 31. It must be noted that this case was not one
of grave and sudden provocation in the true sense, but rather one of defense of wife
from an assault, which right was presumptively exceeded.
39 If this analysis were correct, the accused in an honor killing case ought to be
acquitted rather than convicted for a different category of Qatl-i-Amd. This is be-
cause §§96, 97 and 100 read together state that "nothing is an offence which is
done in the exercise of the right of private defence" of one's "own body and the
body of any other person," and this right extends to the voluntary causing of death
. to the assailant if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be ... an
assault with the intent of committing rape." It could, however, be argued that rea-
sonable force short of causing death may be employed in order to prevent the com-
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It must, however, be noted that this was not a case of honor killing
and the ratio of this case was rather limited.40 The Court converted the
petitioner's case from qatli-i-amd liable to qisas under Section 302(a) to
qatli-i-amd liable to tazir under Section 302(b) and sentenced him to life
imprisonment. The Court reiterated the rule that if the conviction is based
upon a confessional statement, then it must be taken in its entirety. As such,
the Court held that if an accused makes a statement admitting the fact of
intentional killing but maintains that he did so under grave and sudden
provocation, this statement would not qualify as a 'confession' that would
render the case one of Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas.41
On January 28, 2006, the Supreme Court of Pakistan decided Ali
Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad.42 The accused claimed that he had killed the
deceased under grave and sudden provocation upon seeing him and his wife
"lying on the same bed in an objectionable position. ' 43 The trial court had
convicted the accused under the old Section 304, Part I, without realizing
that this provision was no longer on the statute books, and sentenced him to
undergo imprisonment for seven years. On appeal, Ausaf Ali Khan, J. of the
Lahore High Court pointed out this error and noted that the Islamized provi-
sions did not provide an exception in cases of provocation, but held, none-
theless, that the accused had raised a valid defense. He based this judgment
on the Islamic law doctrine of the sanctity of home:
mission of zina (consensual sexual intercourse) with a woman under one's
protection (in the above sense) since that is a serious crime under Islamic law.
Honor killing situations then become comparable to those situations where the right
of private defense of person is exceeded. Note that the old Exception 2 of §300
which stated:
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise
in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property,
exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of
the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence
without premeditation...
Simply, this is another way of reintroducing provocation and other old specific
exceptions to murder through the back door.
40 The petitioner had killed the deceased in a courtroom during the trial of the
deceased for the murder of the petitioner's father. The deceased had abused the
petitioner by saying that he would rape his wife and all the women of his tribe if he
were acquitted. The Court found that such abuse "was traditionally beyond tolera-
tion of a Pathan."
41 Abdul Haque, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. 1 at 34.
42 Ali Muhammad, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. 274.
43 Id. at 278.
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And to enter a house without permission at night and com-
mit Zina with wife/daughter/sister of owner of a house was
obviously a vice which could be stopped with force. . In
fact Islam does extend the right to the aggressed to take life
of the aggressor in such a situation."
Again relying upon verse 4:34 of the Qur'an,45 the Lahore High
Court further held that this right of defense of person was available not only
to the woman's husband, but also to any other person "in whose lawful
custody she is residing." 46 The court held that "the appellant as custodian of
honor of his wife had the right to kill the deceased while he was engaged in
sex act with his wife and he had not earned liability of Qisas or Tazir or
even Diyat.' ' 47 Thus, the accused was acquitted.
The Supreme Court explained to the 'uninitiated' that no anomaly
exists in the High Court's decision to equate provocation with self-defense.
Citing numerous English precedents about provocation, the Supreme Court
suggested that there lies a universal belief that the natural response for a
man is to lose self-control upon seeing his wife in an adulterous situation,
just as much as it is natural for a man to use force in self-defense. 4 The
Court then pointed out that the issue surrounding the conformity of excep-
tions to murder with the injunctions of Islam had been taken up by the
Federal Shariat Court in the case of Muhammad Riaz v. Federal Govern-
ment, prior to its decision in Gul Hassan Khan.49 In that case, Aftab Hus-
sain, Member, averred in his leading opinion that the exceptions to Section
300 did "not present any difficulty in respect of reconciliation with Quran
and Sunnah.''50 When the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court
later addressed this same issue in Gul Hasan Khan, Pir Muhammad Karam
Shah, J. agreed with the view of Aftab Hussain, Member in Muhammad
Riaz, on this particular point.51 On the other hand, Maulana Muhammad
Taqi Usmani, J. recorded a separate opinion in which he expressed a differ-
ent view on grave and sudden provocation. The Supreme Court argued that
the majority of the judges in Gul Hasan Khan had agreed with Pir Muham-
44 Ali Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad, 1993 P.Cr.L.J. 557 at 563.
45 See supra note 37 for translation.
46 Ali Muhammad, 1993 P. Cr. L.J. at 564.
47 Id. at 565.
48 Ali Muhammad, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. at 280-82.
49 Muhammad Riaz v. Federal Government, P.L.D. 1980 F.S.C. 1.
5o Ali Muhammad, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. at 284.
51 Id.
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mad Karam Shah, J., including Nasim Hassan Shah, J.,52 and Maulana
Muhammad Taqi Usmani's opinion was a minority view. The Supreme
Court thereby suggested that the exclusion of the exceptions to Section 300
from the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance of 1990, was an
oversight and held that "there should be no doubt that the cases covered by
the exceptions to the old section 300, P.P.C. read with the old section 304
thereof, are cases which were intended to be dealt with under clause (c) of
the new section 302 of the P.P.C." 53
Hence, the court finally clarified and distinguished the sub-clauses
for this seemingly redundant provision. Cases of honor killing which meet
the test of grave and sudden provocation no longer fall under Section 302(a)
or (b) but, instead, are now converted into cases covered by Section 302(c).
Since Section 302(c) does not specify a minimum punishment, the courts
were granted the freedom to revert to their pre-1990 approach. Even in the
instant case, the Supreme Court reawakened the specter of Kamal v. State
and held that the length of imprisonment already served by the accused,
approximately three years, would suffice.
V. CRIMINAL LAW (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2004
After Pakistan gained considerable notoriety amongst the interna-
tional media on account of its failure to curb murders in the name of honor,
constant pressure from women's rights groups and human rights "watch-
dogs", substantial public debate and political wrangling, the Parliament fi-
nally passed a legislative measure to address these issues. The measure was
enacted under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2004, effective the
fourth of January 2005. The Act introduced a number of potentially signifi-
cant changes to the laws relating to murder. First, the Act has barred ac-
cused persons from becoming an heir (wali) of the victim in the case of
murder committed "in the name or on the pretext of honor. '54 This provi-
sion is ostensibly designed to ensure that the offender does not grant him-
self pardon for his own crime. However, in reality, it is likely to have a very
limited impact since only one wali's waiver of qisas is needed to save the
accused from the death penalty, and in most cases of honor killing, there is
at least one family member who is willing to forgive. Second, the Act has
52 Id. at 284-85. Contrast from Nasim Hassan Shah, J.'s opinion in Abdul
Waheed, 1992 P. Cr. L.J. 1596.
53 Id. at 290-91. The Court held that "there should be no doubt that the cases
covered by the Exceptions to the old section 300, P.P.C. read with the old section
304 thereof, are cases which were intended to be dealt with under clause (c) of the
new section 302." See text accompanying note 28 supra.
54 CRIMINAL LAW (AMENDMENT) ACT, §4 (2004).
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increased the maximum punishment of Qatl-i-Amd not liable to qisas, pun-
ishable under Section 308 from fourteen to twenty-five years. 55 Again, this
provision is unlikely to have an impact since in such cases of intra-family
murders, judges do not exercise their discretion to award tazir punishment.
If, in addition to increasing the maximum penalty a minimum sentence had
also been specified for honor killings, then this provision would be more
meaningful. Third, Section 311 of the P.P.C. has been amended such that
the definition of fasad-fil-arz has been enlarged to include murder commit-
ted "in the name or on the pretext of honor. '56 In this respect, the maximum
tazir penalty that a court may award after the waiver of qisas in cases of
Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas, punishable under Section 302(a), has also been
increased to death or life imprisonment, in addition to imprisonment for up
to fourteen years as was previously the case. 57 This, by itself, will achieve
little since our judges are unlikely to give such serious penalties after qisas
has been waived. A more significant change, however, is that the provision
mandates a minimum penalty of imprisonment of ten years as tazir for
Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas, after waiver of qisas, if the crime has been com-
mitted "in the name or on the pretext of honour.' '58 A similar approach has
been adopted by setting a minimum penalty of ten years for attempted mur-
der.59 Finally, and of most importance, the Act has added a proviso to Sec-
tion 302(c) to the effect that that clause would not apply to any murder
committed "in the name or on the pretext of honor. '60 This provision is
partially intended to undo Ali Muhammad and, thereby, deny the defense of
grave and sudden provocation in cases of honor killing.
However, certain shortcomings in the 2004 Act may potentially un-
ravel any ameliorative impact that it may have. The critics of the Act de-
cried its failure to deny the options of waiver of qisas, pardon, or
compoundability to the family members of the victim and the culprit in
honor killing cases. 61 It was proposed that the state ought to be the heir in
honor killing cases so that all prosecution decisions would be under the
state's control. 62 But, the drafters of the Act chose a different methodology
for resolving the problem - to specify mandatory minimum penalties -
which was likely to be more apt to both sides of this divided issue. Unfortu-
55 CRIMINAL LAW (AMENDMENT) ACT, §5 (2004).
56 CRIMINAL LAW (AMENDMENT) ACT, §8 (2004).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 CRIMINAL LAW (AMENDMENT) ACT, § 10 (2004).
60 CRIMINAL LAW (AMENDMENT) ACT, §3 (2004).
61 See Hussain, supra note 5 at 240.
62 rA
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nately, this approach has not been consistently adopted. Whereas a mini-
mum penalty of ten years has been mandated for Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas,
if committed in an honor killing scenario, no mandatory minimum sentence
has been specified for Qatl-i-Amd not liable to qisas. Qatl-i-Amd liable to
tazir already has a minimum penalty of life imprisonment, and arguably the
mandatory minimum for Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas and Qatl-i-Amd not lia-
ble to qisas, when committed in the name of honor, ought to be life impris-
onment as well.
Further, as already noted, the Act seeks to deny the defense of
grave and sudden provocation in honor killing cases, by banning its conver-
sion into a Section 302(c) offense. Perhaps a more consistent approach
would have been to specify a minimum penalty for this offense, comparable
to those specified for other categories of Qatl-i-Amd. The most disturbing
shortcoming of this Act is its definition of honor killing. The Act defines
honor killing as an offense "committed in the name or on the pretext of
honor," meaning an offense "committed in the name or on the pretext of
karo kari, siyah kari or similar other customs or practices. '63 This may be
narrowly interpreted to mean that those crimes covered by the provisions of
this Act are only those that are committed in accordance with notorious
customary practices, pursuant to decisions of tribal councils, and with plan-
ning and premeditation. Such a narrow definition would undermine the at-
tempted exclusion of the defense of grave and sudden provocation, and
reduce the minimum penalty provisions, thereby taking the vast majority of
honor killings outside the scope of the Act. 64
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S PERSISTENT ADHERENCE TO THE DOCTRINE
OF GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court are harbingers of the dark-
ness beyond the limited horizons of Pakistan's superior judiciary. In
Muhammad Ameer v. The State the petitioner sought leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of the Lahore High Court in
which that court had upheld his conviction for Qatl-i-Amd liable to tazir
and sentenced him to life imprisonment.65 The High Court also directed the
petitioner to pay a compensation of Rs. 1 lac (approximately USD $1,650)
63 CRIMINAL LAW (AMENDMENT) ACT, §2 (2004).
64 Such a narrow interpretation is unfortunately supported by subsequent provi-
sions of the Act which dispense with the clause "in the name or on the pretext ofhonor" and simply define honor killings in terms of offenses "committed in the
name or on the pretext of karo kari, siyah kari or similar other customs or prac-
tices." See CRIMINAL LAW (AMENDMENT) ACT, §§14, 15 and 16 (2004).
65 Muhammad Ameer v. The State, P.L.D. 2006 S.C. 283.
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or to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two additional years in the in-
stance that the offender has defaulted on such payment. The prosecution
had alleged that the petitioner and his brother had ambushed the two vic-
tims and open-fired upon them. The motivation of this double-murder was
stated to be the dishonor caused to the petitioner's family by the illicit rela-
tionship between one of the victims and the petitioner's daughter. In his
defense, the petitioner did not deny his role in the incident, but contended
that he had lost his self control due to grave and sudden provocation upon
hearing that his daughter had been raped by the deceased. 66
The Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal stating that
even if the petitioner's version was fully believed, intervention would not
be justified:
The commission of an offence due to Ghairat or family
honour must be differentiated from the grave and sudden
provocation in consequence to which crime is committed in
the light of facts and circumstances of each case. The plea
of grave and sudden provocation may not be available to an
accused who having taken plea of Ghairat and family hon-
our, committed the crime with premeditation. 67
As such, the court drew a distinction between honor killing and
grave and sudden provocation that dates back to its pre-1990 jurisprudence.
In essence, the Court defined honor killing as those murders which are com-
mitted coolly and with premeditation. 68 It also implied that if murder is
committed in the name of honor, but without premeditation, it will continue
to fall within the purview of the doctrine of grave and sudden provocation.
If this approach is followed to its logical conclusion, this vicious circle will
repeat itself twice within the short span of less than two decades.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's approach in Muhammad Ameer suggests a
continuing willingness to allow the defense of grave and sudden provoca-
tion in most cases of murder committed "in the name or on the pretext of
honor". Certain deficiencies in the structure and ambiguities rooted in the
text of the 2004 Act appear to indicate that this Act shall not be given due
deference by the Supreme Court. In essence, this will result in Pakistan's
66 Id. at 288.
67 Id.
68 It is impossible to differentiate between this case and the judgment in Allah
Wasaya, 1977 S.C.M.R. 44.
2008 JUDICIAL PATRONAGE OF 'HONOR KILLINGS' 69
superior courts' continuous leniency in the sentencing of honor killings It
has become extremely difficult to comprehend, let alone justify, judicial
allegiance to grave and sudden provocation in these cases, lately in the face
of statutory intervention as well as Islamic law doctrine. This allegiance
appears to be rooted in the belief that it is 'natural' and 'moral' for a man to
kill a female relative when his honor is jeopardized because of her, and that
it is, therefore, unfair to punish him in these circumstances. This approach
negates the use of criminal law as a tool for socio-cultural engineering or
for fostering certain progressive attitudes in its subjects. This retrogressive
approach will only lead to the loss of more innocent lives, the branding of
Pakistan as an extremist society, and the continual dishonor of Pakistan's
Supreme Court.
Those who advocate the end of the legal patronage of honor killings
in Pakistan ought to prepare themselves for yet another battle. It would be
advisable to argue for effective and broad implementation of mandatory,
minimum imprisonment terms - preferably life imprisonment - for all
murders committed in the name of honor, including those committed while
in the "heat of passion", irrespective of the particular category of Qatl-i-
Amd the offence may technically fall under. Statutory curtailment of judi-
cial discretion in sentencing appears to be the only viable option. It is also
an option which has gained acceptance under the particular strain of Islamic
legal theory favored by Pakistan's courts and the supporters of the Qisas
and Diyat laws. 69
69 See text accompanying supra note 18. The quoted passage from Gul Hasan
Khan acknowledges the state's discretion in specifying tazir punishments even
where the accused is justified in killing the victim under Islamic law.

